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Of Justice Sotomayor and the Jicarilla Apache Nation: Slouching Toward 
Intellectual Honesty and the Canons of Construction 
 
Jeremy Stevens1 
 
“[O]ur treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other 
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”2 
 
“Never regard something as doing you good if it makes you betray a 
trust or lose your sense of shame or makes you show hatred, suspicion, 
ill-will or hypocrisy or a desire for things best done behind closed doors.”3 
 
Since 1831, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a 
general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.4 Over the past 
century in fact, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this “distinctive obligation of trust 
incumbent upon the Government” in its dealings with Indians.5 The US Congress also 
has recognized the “general trust relationship” between the United States and Indian 
tribes; indeed, nearly “every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian tribes 
contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the federal 
Government.”6 Within the framework of this “general trust relationship,” Congress has 
enacted scores of statues defining the contours of the United States’ fiduciary 
responsibilities vis-à-vis its management of Indian tribal property and other trust assets.7 
In assessing claims of the breach of this general trust relationship over the past thirty 
years,8 the federal circuit and Supreme Court, once finding the existence of a trust, 
have imported common-law trust principles to aid “in drawing the inference that 
Congress intended damages to remedy a breach.”9 Ostensibly, the special trust 
relationship extant between Indian tribes and the federal government in its best and 
purest form represents the federal government’s “humane and self-imposed policy . . . 
                                                 
1
 J.D. candidate, 2012, Seattle University School of Law. Special thanks to Heidi Adams for her attention 
to detail, to Barbara Swatt Engstrom for her technical help, to Seattle University School of Law’s Center 
for Indian Law & Policy for the great work they do, and to Eric Eberhard for educating us all. 
2
 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 
348, 390 (1953). 
3
 MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS, III. 7 (Gregory Hays, trans., Modern Library 2002) (ca. 175). 
4
 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
5
 See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 
206, 225–26 (1983) (noting “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United 
States and the Indian people”). 
6
 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[4][a], at 420–21 (2005 ed.). 
7
 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983). 
8
 Id.; see generally United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); and see 
generally United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); see also Janice Aitken, The Trust 
Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract 
Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18. N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115 (1997). 
9
 United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 
477). Note that Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion in Navajo Nation, then later disregarded his 
own writing in Jicarilla Apache Nation. See 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). See also infra Part II. 
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[of] charg[ing] itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust,”10 
obligations “to the fulfillment of which the national honor has been committed.”11  
 
But a recent Supreme Court decision and outlier among breach of trust opinions 
threatens to insulate the federal government from liability for breaching its trust duty to 
tribes. It is to that decision, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,12 that this article is 
directed; specifically, this article is directed toward negating the Court’s judicial fiat by 
applying the well-established canons of construction of federal Indian law.  
 
Part I presents an overview of the trust relationship between the federal 
government and American Indian tribes, including a discussion of federal management 
and trusteeship of Indian-owned monies. Next, Part II summarizes the Jicarilla breach of 
trust case and the Court’s 7–1 majoritarian fiat in favor of the federal government, and 
also summarizes Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s brave and honest dissent. Finally, Part III 
addresses the canons of construction in federal Indian jurisprudence and the entire 
Court’s disregard of the canons in Jicarilla, concluding with the importance of these 
canons and the grave consequences of sweeping them aside.  
I. The Special Trust Relationship Between the Federal Government and Indian 
Tribes 
Whatever may have been the founders’ intentions in penning the Indian 
commerce clause,13 the US Constitution contains very little express delineation of any 
relationship between the US government and those whose government it supplanted. 
The genesis of the trust relationship, then, is best understood as a judicial conjuring. In 
1831, Chief Justice John Marshall characterized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent 
nations”14 whose right to occupy their ancestral lands existed at the sufferance of the 
United States. “Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”15 Notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s 
literary or philosophical effect, he made no attempt to codify the strictures of any 
guardian-ward relationship. Nevertheless, his statement provided the conceptual basis 
on which, fifty years later, the Supreme Court would uphold the Major Crimes Act.16   
 
In United States v. Kagama,17 the Court maintained that Indians, as “wards of the 
nation,” depended upon the United States “largely for their daily food” and their “political 
rights.”18 Indeed, from the Indians’ “weakness and helplessness” arose “the duty of 
                                                 
10
 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296–97. 
11
 Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912). 
12
 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). 
13
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
tribes”). 
14
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
15
 Id. 
16
 Originally enacted in 1885, the Major Crimes Act has been amended numerous times and now places 
federal jurisdiction specifically over thirteen major crimes when committed by an Indian against another 
Indian in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
17
 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
18
 Id. at 383–84. 
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protection”19 incumbent upon the federal government. Yet this “duty of protection,” this 
trust responsibility, was not only to be used as a shield protecting the Indians from 
various ills (the states and themselves, for example), but it would similarly be used as a 
sword for the US government. It comes as no surprise, then, that seventeen years later 
in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock20 the Court upheld a statute that distributed Kiowa tribal lands 
in modern-day Oklahoma in violation of an 1867 treaty that required three-fourths of the 
reservation’s adult males to validate any cession of tribal land,21 and did so pursuant to 
its trust responsibility. Congress had paramount authority over Indian property, began 
the Court; and casting aside prior decisions that supported Indian occupation of tribal 
lands, the Court held that Congress’s power was in fact plenary over the sum of Indian 
affairs.22 Congress thus had the right to effect by fiat “mere change[s] in the form of 
investment of Indian tribal property.”23 Whereas once the Kiowa had occupied and held 
lands long sacred to them, because the US Congress believed it consistent with its 
plenary authority over Indians and its trust responsibility to them, the Kiowa now had 
money.24    
 
The idea of federal management/trusteeship of Indian-owned funds25 began with 
congressional enactments in the early nineteenth century, which directed the 
government to hold and manage Indian tribal funds in trust.26 As a result, the United 
States has come to manage nearly $3 billion in tribal funds, collecting and maintaining 
annually some $380 million on behalf of tribes.27 Today, scores of statutes outline the 
“Federal Government’s obligations as trustee in managing Indian trust funds;”28 and 
Congress has set forth a “nonexhaustive list of the Secretary of the Interior’s trust 
responsibilities,”29 among them, an array of accounting, auditing, disclosure, and 
general management obligations.30 Regarding these obligations, the Court held in 1942 
that where a treaty required the federal government to pay tribal members, the 
                                                 
19
 Id. at 384. 
20
 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
21
 Id. at 554 (referencing Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche, U.S.-Confederated Tribes of Kiowa and 
Comanche Indians, art. XII, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581). 
22
 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 353, 565 (1903). 
23
 Id. at 568. 
24
 The federal government entered into an agreement (arguably induced by fraud) to pay the tribes $ 2 
million to allot 2 million acres of the reservation for settlement by non-Indians. The federal government 
valued the land at one dollar per acre because it found that such an arrangement served its trust 
responsibility to the Kiowa Tribe. Id. at 555–56. 
25
 Trust fund monies are “comprised mainly of money received through the sale or lease of trust lands 
and include timber stumpage, oil and gas royalties, and agriculture fees,” as well as “judgment funds 
awarded to tribes.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-778, at 10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3467, 3468. 
26
 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 9, 1837, 5 Stat. 135. See also MISPLACED TRUST: THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS’ 
MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H.R. REP. NO. 102-449, at 6 (1992). 
27
 FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.03[3][b] at 407(2005 ed.). See supra note 25. 
28
 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2334 (2011) (Sotomayor J., dissenting). 
29
 Id. at 2335. 
30
 See 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d). 
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government was more than a “mere contracting party” and was to “be judged by the 
most exacting fiduciary standards.”31 
 
Called upon to address breach of trust obligations based on timber management 
statutes,32 in United States v. Mitchell33 (Mitchell II) the Court held that actual control 
over tribal resources by the federal government gives rise to a breach of trust claim.34 
When the government “assumes . . . elaborate control over forests and property 
belonging to Indians[, a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: 
a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus 
(Indian timber, lands, and funds).”35 When this trust relationship exists, continued the 
Court, “it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the 
breach of its fiduciary duties.”36 Thus, a statute creates a right capable of grounding a 
claim for breach of trust duties only if the statute “can fairly be interpreted as mandating 
compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.”37 Sufficient to 
support liability for a breach of trust claim is that the statute creating the right “be 
reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages.”38 
A damages remedy is proper when it would “[further] the purposes of the statutes and 
regulations” that impose the responsibility. 39 
 
 The threshold inquiry, then, in assessing whether a tribe may state an actionable 
breach of trust claim is whether the tribe can “identify a substantive source of law that 
establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed 
                                                 
31
 See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97. The federal government in Seminole 
Nation was obliged to pay each tribal member. Instead, the federal government had been paying the tribal 
government that was known to be misappropriating the individual members’ money. 
32
 E.g. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406–407, 466. 
33
 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II). In Mitchell II, the Court addressed breach of 
trust claims of 1,400 Quinault Indians who, defeated by the Supreme Court just three years earlier in 
United States v. Mitchell (445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I)), sought money damages for the 
mismanagement of timber on reservation lands held in trust. The aggrieved 1,400 claimed breach based 
upon sundry timber management statutes and regulations imposed by the Department of the Interior. 
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. Concerning Mitchell II and other trust cases herein cited or addressed, the 
Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505, grants Indian tribes access to federal courts if some other statute or 
common law doctrine creates a substantive right enforceable against the United States. As for a federal 
waiver of sovereign immunity, “a waiver is readily apparent in claims founded upon ‘any express or 
implied contract with the United States.’” Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 215 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491). This 
waiver applies categorically to claims founded upon “executive regulations[, . . .]claims found upon 
contracts and claims founded upon other specified sources of law.” Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216. 
34
 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (The 
“language of Mitchell II makes quite clear that control alone is sufficient to create a fiduciary 
relationship.”); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. 
REV. 753, 804 (1992) (“As long as the Government . . . has actual control over the management of a 
resource, the exercise of this control can create a trust claim”). 
35
 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. 
36
 Id. at 226. 
37
 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 
at 217, 218). 
38
 Id. at 473. 
39
 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226-27. 
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faithfully to perform those duties.”40 The tribe need not justify each of any claimed trust 
responsibility by pointing to a specific statute; instead, if a relevant statutory framework 
“bears the hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship,” the Court consistently 
looks to common law general trust principles to flesh out the government’s fiduciary 
obligation.41 If the tribe meets this threshold, a reviewing court must then assess 
whether the relevant substantive source of law “can fairly be interpreted as mandating 
compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties . . . 
impose[d].”42 Further, the “existence of a general trust relationship between the United 
States and the Indian people” can “reinforce” the imposition of fiduciary duties,43 but the 
general trust relationship alone is insufficient to support the imposition of fiduciary 
duties. Accordingly, analyzing whether a federal court will find a breach of trust “must 
train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.”44 
And the relevant substantive source of law need not expressly guarantee an injured 
tribe the right to common law damages; indeed, the Court has made clear while 
weaving the tapestry of its seminal breach of trust opinions that any such right to 
damages may also be implied by a relevant statutory framework. 45 
II. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation 
The United States holds about 900,000 acres of reservation land in trust for the 
people of the Jicarilla Apache Nation, land rich with timber, gravel, oil, and gas 
resources, “developed pursuant to statutes administered by the Department of the 
Interior.”46 Funds derived from these natural resources the government holds in trust for 
the Jicarilla.47 In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation sued the United States for an alleged 
breach of fiduciary duties concerning its management of the tribe’s trust land.48 The 
phase of that litigation relevant to Jicarilla Apache Nation involves the government’s 
accounting, management, and investment of these trust funds from 1972 to 1992.49 
                                                 
40
 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) (citing Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216–17, 219). 
41
 United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (quotation marks omitted) (citing White Mountain 
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 473). See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003) (construing 
the government’s duties by reference to “elementary trust law”); see also Seminole Nation v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (relying on general trust principles to conclude that the government had 
common law trust fiduciary duties to prevent misappropriation of tribal funds); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 
1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that although the “general ‘contours’ of the government’s obligations” 
are defined by statute, the “interstices must be filled in through reference to general trust law” (citing 
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224)). 
42
 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219. 
43
 Id. at 225. 
44
 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 490. 
45
 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 217 n.16 (quotation marks omitted). See also Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506 
(“Those prescriptions need not . . . expressly provide for money damages; the availability of such 
damages may be inferred”). 
46
 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2318 (2011). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 2318–19. The tribe’s claims arise under 25 U.S.C. §§ 161, 161a, 161b, 162a, and the American 
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001– 61, which recognizes and 
codifies the existing and relevant trust relationship. These statutes expressly refer to the United States as 
“trustee of the various Indian tribes,” id. § 161, and to the accounts here at issue as “tribal trust funds.” Id. 
§ 162a. The statutes also recognize the United States’ control over the management and investment of 
61 
Over the course of more than five years worth of alternative dispute resolution, 
the tribe identified 226 documents—memoranda concerning trust administration 
exchanged between attorneys within the Department of the Interior (DOI), Office of the 
Solicitor, various agency personnel within the DOI including the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), the Department of the Treasury, and even the government’s “accounting firm”50—
that had been withheld by the government on the basis of the attorney-client privilege 
and attorney work-product protections. At the tribe’s request, in 2008 the case was 
restored to the active litigation docket.51 The Court of Federal Claims (CFC) divided the 
case into various phases for trial and “set a discovery schedule.”52 During the discovery 
process of the first phase of litigation—the phase dealing with management of the 
Jicarilla Apache Nation’s trust accounts from 1972 to 1992—the government refused to 
provide these 226 documents.53 Responding to the tribe’s motion to compel the 
government to produce the documents, the government produced seventy-one and 
withheld 155, resolute in its assertion of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-
product protections.54 After reviewing in camera the remaining 155 documents, the CFC 
granted in part the tribe’s motion to compel discovery, but allowed the government to 
withhold those documents that the CFC found to be attorney work product.55 The 
government then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “for a writ of 
mandamus directing the CFC to vacate its production order.”56 The Court of Appeals, 
though, sided with the CFC, holding that 
the United States cannot deny an Indian tribe’s request to discover 
communications between the United States and its attorneys based on the 
attorney-client privilege when those communications concern 
management of an Indian trust and the United States has not claimed that 
the government or its attorneys considered a specific competing interest in 
those communications.57 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the tribal trust funds and acknowledge the “[t]rust responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior,” explicitly 
stating that they “shall include (but are not limited to)” providing “adequate systems for accounting for and 
reporting trust fund balances.” Id. § 162a(d). Because these statutory “prescription[s bear] the hallmarks 
of a conventional fiduciary relationship,” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 301 (2009), it 
seems readily apparent that the trust relationship present in Mitchell II is similarly present here. Yet the 
Court did not address this issue head on and made no categorical statement either for or against the 
existence of a trust relationship in this case. It seems reasonable to presume that the Court accepted the 
existence of a trust relationship concerning the statutes here at issue; nevertheless, in light of the 
question the Court was here called upon to answer and in light of its answer to that question, whether or 
not a trust relationship actually exists is irrelevant. And though I have presented an outline of what in fact 
creates the trust relationship in supra Part I, the remainder of this article and my analysis has very little if 
anything to do with finding or not finding the existence of a trust relationship. Much has been written on 
the subject and I likely have little to add. 
50
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2319. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 2320. 
57
 In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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Because the government “had not alleged that the legal advice in this case related to 
such conflicting interests,” the CFC did not discuss how the fiduciary exception might 
apply in that situation.58 The government then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, and the Court granted it to answer “[w]hether the attorney-client 
privilege entitle[d] the United States to withhold from an Indian tribe confidential 
communications between the government and government attorneys implicating the 
administration of statutes pertaining to property held in trust for the tribe.”59 On January 
7, 2011, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari60 and heard 
oral arguments on April 22, 2011. Less than two months later on June 13, the Court 
issued Justice Alito’s 7–1 majority opinion, finding for the government. 61 
a. Justice Alito’s 7–1 Majority Opinion 
 
  “The attorney-client privilege,” began Justice Alito, “ranks among the oldest and 
most established evidentiary privileges known to our law. The common law, however, 
has recognized an exception to the privilege when a trustee obtains legal advice related 
to the exercise of fiduciary duties.”62 But the common law—its constraints and strictures 
on the nature of a trusteeship—is but an “analogy” that “cannot be taken too far.”63 
Indeed the “trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes,” wrote Justice 
Alito, “are established and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in 
fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but pursuant to 
its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”64 
 
Despite the fact that “trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are 
established and governed by statute rather than the common law,” Justice Alito began 
with Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states that evidentiary privileges 
“shall be governed by the principles of the common law . . . in the light of reason and 
                                                 
58
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2320. Under long-established common law principles, a trust 
beneficiary is entitled to “such information as is reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to prevent 
or redress a breach of trust and otherwise to enforce his or her rights under the trust.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. a(2) (2007). Under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege, this 
includes legal advice provided to the trustee about management of the trust. Note that Congress has 
“[p]lenary authority” over the sum of Indian affairs, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 553, 565 (1903), 
and has never explicitly exempted the government from these principles. 
59
 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2010 WL 3641207 (Sept. 
20, 2010) (No. 10-382). 
60
 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011) (No. 10-382) (granting cert.). 
61
 7–1. Justice Sotomayor dissented; Justice Kagan took no part in the case. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 
S. Ct. at 2313. 
62
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2318. 
63
 Id.  
64
 Id. But cf. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290–91 (2009) (stating that once a tribe has 
identified a “substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties . . . principles of 
trust law might be relevant in drawing the inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a 
breach”) (quotation marks omitted); and United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 474–
76 (2003) (stating that a “fair inference that the Government is subject to duties as a trustee and liable in 
damages for breach” supports the importation “of the fundamental common-law dut[y] on the part of a 
trustee  . . . to preserve and maintain trust assets”). 
63 
experience.”65 Justice Alito then referenced two common law criteria, imported from 
English courts, “justifying the fiduciary exception.”66 First, because a trustee has the 
fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of the trust’s beneficiary, the trust’s 
beneficiary is the “real client”67 of any attorney who advises the trustee regarding trust-
related matters; accordingly, the attorney-client privilege belongs more properly to the 
beneficiary than to the trustee. Second, a trustee’s “fiduciary duty to furnish trust-related 
information”68 to the beneficiary outweighs the trustee’s interest in the attorney-client 
privilege. More information helps a trust’s beneficiary to monitor the trustee’s 
management of the trust and disclosure, and is therefore a “weightier public policy than 
the preservation of confidential attorney-client communications.”69 But the government, 
noted the Court, “of course, is not a private trustee.”70 
 
Whereas the strictures of a common-law trusteeship exist between two private 
parties, the general trust relationship extant between Indian tribes and the federal 
government is a “sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress.”71 It 
was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to analogize the government to a private 
trustee in finding for the tribes.72 The government “consents to be liable to private 
‘parties and may yield this consent upon such terms and under such restrictions as it 
may think just.’”73 The organization and management of any general trust between the 
government and Indian tribes is subject to the plenary authority of Congress, waxed the 
Court, and because the “Indian trust relationship represents an exercise of that 
authority,”74 the government’s interest in the trust relationship is “vested in it as a 
sovereign.”75 Accordingly, the maintenance and the strictures of any trust relationship 
extant due to the plenary authority of Congress is distinctly an interest of the United 
States,76 and the government assumes trust responsibilities “only to the extent it 
expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute.”77 Thus, the Court held that in order 
to access privileged information from the government against the government’s wishes, 
the Jicarilla must “point to a right conferred by statute or regulation” in order to do so.78 
Notwithstanding the categorical non-relevance of a common law trustee’s duties to a 
beneficiary, the Court then, after making this pronouncement, did not perform any 
rigorous statutory analysis in order to assess whether the tribe can “point to a right 
                                                 
65
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). 
66
 Id. at 2326. 
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. at 2322. 
69
 Id. at 2322 (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. Ch. 
1976)). 
70
 Id. at 2323. 
71
 Id. 
72
 In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
73
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2323 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 283 (1855)). 
74
 Id. at 2324. 
75
 Id. (quoting United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926)).  
76
 Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912)). 
77
 Id. at 2325. See also case cited supra note 63. 
78
 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2325. 
64 
conferred by statute or regulation.”79 After essentially pronouncing the issue outside the 
realm of the common law, the Court nevertheless weighed the two common law 
features that justify the fiduciary exception, and found each wanting.80 
 
 As noted earlier, the two features of the common law that justify the fiduciary 
exception to the attorney-client privilege are the beneficiary’s status as the concerned 
attorney’s real client and the trustee’s duty to disclose information about the trust.81 
Citing the “leading American case on the fiduciary exception,”82 the Court observed that 
“Courts look to the source of funds as a strong indicator of precisely who the real clients 
were and a significant factor in determining who ought to have access to the legal 
advice.”83 Because the attorneys here at issue were paid out of congressional 
appropriations at no expense to the tribe, the “payment structure confirms” the Court’s 
view “that the Government seeks legal advice in its sovereign capacity.”84  
 
 As for a fiduciary’s duty to disclose to a beneficiary all information related to trust 
management, the Court cursorily addressed the relevant statutes—that the Secretary 
must supply the trustees with, inter alia, “periodic statements of their account 
performance”85—and concluded that common-law theory of a fiduciary’s duty to disclose 
is not to be used to illuminate whether the relevant statutes can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation for damages because the “common law of trusts does not 
override the specific trust-creating statute and regulations that apply here. Those 
provisions define the Government’s disclosure obligation to the Tribe.”86 The statutes do 
not say that the government assumes the common-law duty to disclose information 
related to the administration of Indian trusts and which is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege: thus, the Court declined to read a “catchall provision” that would impose it.87 
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Whereas past Courts were to be guided by the common law rubric of trust management 
once a statutory framework created a fiduciary duty on the part of the United States to 
the tribes,88 here and now, this Court would not consider common law trust principles in 
assessing the government’s liability because the relevant statutory framework89 does 
not specifically say that these principles apply. 
 
b. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
Justice Sotomayor called the Court’s chicanery for what it is and argued for stare  
decisis.90 Whereas the majority held that the common law has no application to the 
current context, Justice Sotomayor repeated the established maxim91 that once a 
statutory scheme “establishes a conventional fiduciary relationship, the Government’s 
duties include fiduciary obligations derived from common-law trust principles.”92 
 
Citing the framework established by the Court’s own opinions in its seminal trust 
decisions, Sotomayor wrote that the statutes here at issue “give the United States full 
responsibility to manage Indian trust fund accounts for the benefit of the Indians.”93 
Under the relevant statutory regime then, “the Government has extensive managerial 
control over Indian trust funds, exercises considerable discretion with respect to their 
investment, and has assumed significant responsibilities to account to the tribal 
beneficiaries.”94 In deference to precedent, having found a trust relationship between 
the United States and the tribe, Sotomayor imported principles of common-law trust 
management to assess the government’s reliance on the attorney-client privilege to 
withhold the 155 documents that related to trust management. 
 
 Beginning with FRE 501, Sotomayor notes that the attorney-client privilege is “a 
limited exception to the usual rules of evidence requiring full disclosure of relevant 
information.”95 When a trustee obtains “legal advice relating to his administration of the 
trust, and not in anticipation of adversarial legal proceedings against him, the 
beneficiaries of the trust ha[ve] the right to the production of that advice.”96 And 
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justifying this common-law fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege are two 
rationales, each of which the majority, even for its refusal to import common-law trust 
principles, addressed and found wanting. Justice Sotomayor also addressed each in 
turn, and found each compelling. 
 
 As a fiduciary for the tribal trust—in this case, the approximately 900,000 acres of 
land—the government’s management of the trust must be judged by the “most exacting 
fiduciary standards.”97 Among the most fundamental of fiduciary obligations of a trustee 
is “to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”98 The government is 
therefore legally required “to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiaries,” and its conduct vis-à-vis its trust obligation cannot be anything distinct 
from its responsibilities as a fiduciary.99 Consequently, while the majority argued that the 
government’s interest in the trust relationship is “vested in it as a sovereign,”100 in 
reality, waxed Sotomayor, “any uniquely sovereign interest the Government may have 
in other contexts of its trust relationship with Indian tribes does not exist in the specific 
context of Indian trust fund administration.”101 Therefore, the interests of the government 
in seeking advice for purposes of the fiduciary exception are entirely aligned with the 
interests of the nation. The real client served by the documents exchanged by attorney 
and trustee was therefore the beneficiary of the trust: the tribe.    
 
Regarding a trustee’s duty to disclose all relevant matters to the beneficiary, 
Sotomayor recognized the policy behind the duty: that “preserving the full disclosure 
necessary in the trustee-beneficiary relationship is . . . ultimately more important than 
the protection of the trustees’ confidence in the attorney for the trust.”102 Because the 
relevant statutes required the government to act as a conventional fiduciary, the 
common-law duty a fiduciary possesses of keeping the trust’s beneficiary informed of 
matters “relating to trust administration included the concomitant duty to disclose 
attorney-client communications relating to trust fund management.”103 Each justification 
for the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in this instance therefore 
supports disclosing the 155 withheld documents. 
 
Having found that the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied 
to the facts at issue, Sotomayor then addressed the majority’s chief legal error. While 
the majority maintained that the government “assumes Indian trust responsibilities only 
to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute,”104 Sotomayor stated 
the obvious: 
We have never held that all of the Government’s trust responsibilities to 
Indians must be set forth expressly in a specific statute or regulation. To 
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the contrary, where, as here, the statutory framework establishes that the 
relationship between the Government and an Indian tribe bears the 
hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship, . . . we have consistently 
looked to general trust principles to flesh out the Government’s fiduciary 
obligations. . . . Accordingly, although the general contours of the 
government’s obligations’ are defined by statute, the interstices must be 
filled in through reference to general trust law.105 
 
Indeed, the very text of the relevant statutes supports this determination. Section 
162a(d) of the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 sets forth 
eight “trust responsibilities of the United States,”106 and states that the Secretary of the 
Interior’s “proper discharge of the trust responsibilities of the United States shall include 
(but are not limited to)” those eight specified duties. By expressly including the 
parenthetical language, argues Justice Sotomayor, “Congress recognized that the 
Government has pre-existing trust responsibilities that arise out of the broader statutory 
scheme governing the management of Indian trust funds. . . . That conclusion accords 
with common sense as not even the Government argues that it had no disclosure 
obligations with respect to Indian trust funds prior to the enactment of the 1994 Act.”107 
 
 Yet perhaps most prescient and haunting of Sotomayor’s various critiques is her 
prognostication that the Court’s majority opinion may very well serve to reject “the use 
of common-law principles to inform the scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations 
to Indian tribes.”108 What lies down that road is greater than the diminution of tribal 
sovereignty; what lies down that road is the Supreme Court’s systematic countenancing 
of the federal government’s duplicitous, self-serving, and disingenuous application of 
statutes ultimately intended to inure to the benefit of Indians. Indeed, to combat just 
such a possibility, courts past fashioned the canons of construction. 
III. Applying the Canons of Construction of Federal Indian Law 
In order to address the disadvantaged state at which the treaty-making process 
placed tribes and to more satisfactorily affect the federal trust responsibility, the 
Supreme Court has fashioned the canons of construction.109 The canons originally 
applied only to the interpretation of United States-Indian treaties, but over time the Court 
has extended the canons to federal regulations, so long as the regulation was passed 
for the benefit of a tribe.110 Chief among the canons is the rule of sympathetic 
construction. Under this rule, “statutes passed for the benefit of the dependent Indian 
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tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved 
in favor of the Indians.”111 
 
Yet for all her intellectual honesty, Justice Sotomayor’s lone dissenting voice and 
the Court’s 7–1 majoritarian fiat each fail to mention even the whisper of the canons. 
Justice Sotomayor was chiefly motivated by following precedent, not by re-establishing 
precedent. She therefore took aim at the Court’s intellectual prestidigitations vis-à-vis 
the importation of common-law principles of trust management; and because none of 
the seminal trust opinions112 mentions the application—let alone the existence—of the 
canons, within the framework of precedent violated here by the Court, the canons were 
irrelevant to her dissent.113   
 
But the canons are not irrelevant—in fact the canons should be the lynchpin of 
the Court’s analysis. After all, the canons are “rooted in the unique trust relationship 
between the United States and the Indians,”114 and the Trust Fund Management Reform 
Act sets forth procedures so that, inter alia, “the best interests of the Indians will be 
promoted.”115 Accordingly, the initial inquiry in determining the applicability of the 
canons—that the relevant federal regulation must be passed for the benefit of Indians in 
order for the canons to apply—is an inquiry easily and satisfactorily answered by the 
tribe.   
 
But in order to apply the rule of sympathetic construction, the concerned 
regulations passed for the benefit of the tribe must also be ambiguous. Are they? This is 
a troublesome inquiry because at issue in Jicarilla is not whether a specific statute or 
“expression” is ambiguous but whether the common-law itself is: (a) applicable to the 
government’s trusteeship of the tribe’s 900,000 acres of resource-rich land, and (b) if 
relevant, whether the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applies.  
 
Justice Sotomayor effectively answered these questions while complying with the 
Court’s precedent, but the Court has also held in the past that “[a]mbiguities in federal 
law have been construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of 
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.”116 Thus, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is no single specific statutory ambiguity at issue in 
Jicarilla, this discrete issue of “federal law”—the applicability of the fiduciary exception 
to the federal trust responsibility—is capable of differing interpretations.117 The Court of 
Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals, and Justice Sotomayor disagree with seven 
current members of the Supreme Court of the United States; each is presumptively 
reasonable, and what they disagree about is not a question of constitutional law. If this 
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had been the case and the issue here were one of constitutional import, the Supreme 
Court would of course have final say notwithstanding any potential ambiguity.118 But 
here the Court addressed an issue concerning the government’s trust responsibility, a 
rubric of judicial conjuring. It was precisely to more satisfactorily affect this responsibility 
that the applicability of the canons (also a judicial conjuring119) were extended to 
statutes from treaties.120 Thus, the canons’ prerequisite that there exist an ambiguity is 
also a threshold easily satisfied. Accordingly, applying the canons to the question of 
whether the act imports the common-law’s fiduciary exception to the attorney-client 
privilege buttresses Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion, and further dilutes the integrity of 
the majority’s 7–1 opinion.  
 
For its part, it may very well be that the majority did not mention the canons for 
two reasons: first, none of the seminal trust opinions included the canons in their 
analyses; and second, applying the canons to the question at issue here leads 
inexorably to a ruling against the government and for the tribes, thus posing “significant 
and damaging consequences for the government . . . [in] over 90 pending trust cases 
brought by Indian tribes in which the question [here] presented could arise.”121 It may 
very well be that as Justice Sotomayor opines, this Court’s “disregard of . . . [its] settled 
precedent that looks to common-law trust principles to define the scope of the 
Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes”122 will reinvigorate the position of 
“reject[ing] the use of common-law principles to inform the scope of the Government’s 
fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.”123 Down that road awaits ruin and a desire for 
things “done behind closed doors.”124 Yet to combat just such an unhappy eventuality, 
courts past have fashioned the canons of construction and extended their application to 
federal statutes and regulations meant to inure to the benefit of Indians. Indeed, 
applying the canons of construction to illuminate the government’s trust responsibility 
comports with “traditional notions of sovereignty and . . . the federal policy of 
encouraging tribal independence.”125 Would that the Court were true to its own 
pronouncements; would that Justice Sotomayor’s intellectual honesty were the rule and 
not the exception. The ability of Indian tribes to keep the government accountable for 
honoring its trust responsibilities to them may very well depend upon it.  
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